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Consumer Boycotts and Freedom of




Since boycotts often have political motives and objectives, does the United
States Constitution guarantee a right to boycott? In a recent article Profes-
sor Michael Harper suggested that it does. The authors argue that there
can be no unconditional right to boycott. They conclude, however, that con-
stitutional values are properly invoked in defense of boycotts and that ac-
cordingly the government should have to articulate weightier counter-
vailing values in order to suppress a particular boycott or class of
boycotts.
INTRODUCTION
Do I as an individual have a constitutional right to refuse to buy
Coors beer, not because I dislike its taste, not because it is more
filling, carcinogenic, or expensive than other beers, but simply be-
cause I dislike Adolph Coors' politics? This question about the indi-
vidual's right to boycott is prior to any argument about a group's
right to boycott, and it is this first question that Professor Michael
Harper has addressed in a recent and provocative article.' As
Harper demonstrates, its answer does not come easily. For Harper
- as for us, though more tentatively perhaps - the answer to the
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question is "yes." But Harper's "derivation" of his right to boycott is
fundamentally question-begging, and his limitations on the right are
patently ad hoc. Harper has neither securely established nor persua-
sively delimited the right to boycott. Indeed, Harper's treatment only
creates scepticism about whether there can be any unconditional
constitutional right to boycott, much less whether categorical consti-
tutional protection can be derived for some species of boycotts and
not for others. While Harper may be correct when he says about the
Supreme Court's decision in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.2 -
a case affirming a right to boycott - that "hard cases do not always
make bad law," 3 he cannot escape the fact that hard cases do make
hard cases.
THE DERIVATION AND LIMITATION OF THE RIGHT TO BOYCOTT
Harper rejects four possible rationales for the right to boycott
products. First, the right to boycott cannot be securely derived from
the right to engage in expressive conduct, because the latter right
can be limited whenever government has legitimate reasons unre-
lated to the content of the expression for banning or regulating the
conduct, and the government may have legitimate economic reasons
for banning boycotts.4 Second, the right to boycott cannot be derived
from a right of autonomy for essentially the same reason.' Third, the
right to boycott cannot be derived from a right of association, be-
cause the latter can be limited when the state has legitimate reasons
for doing so independently of its interest in suppressing the associa-
tion.6 Fourth, the right to boycott cannot be derived from a right to
petition the government, in part because such a right entails a much
more limited right to boycott than Harper wants to establish, but
primarily again because there are legitimate governmental interests
unrelated to the content of the expression for curtailing this particu-
lar means of petitioning.7
Finding each of these four arguments for the right to boycott in-
sufficient to trump all possible countervailing governmental interests
in prohibiting boycotts, Harper then proposes his own basis for the
right. Essentially, Harper argues that a boycott, whether aimed at
public or private decisionmaking, is a political act quite similar to
voting - that is, a "means by which citizens can influence important
social decisionmaking." 8
2. 102 S.Ct. 3409 (1982).
3. Harper, supra note 1, at 409.
4. Id. at 413-15.
5. Id. at 415-16.
6. Id. at 416-17.
7. Id. at 417-20.
8. Id. at 422-23.
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For Harper, the outstanding virtue of this rationale is that it
secures the right from being defeated by the state interest in protect-
ing persons from economic coercion, since economic coercion is the
very means by which the influence on social decisionmaking is ef-
fected." If there is a right ("privilege") to engage in boycotts as po-
litical acts, there cannot be a right (i.e., there must be "no right") to
be free of such boycotts. 10
Harper immediately turns from his four-page argument in favor of
the right to boycott to a much lengthier discussion embellishing the
right. Harper's readers, however, are justified in pausing before mov-
ing on to that discussion, for Harper's argument for the right to boy-
cott is no argument at all.
Harper does nothing more than to assert that (1) we can concep-
tualize boycotts as political acts," and that (2) boycotts might be
particularly effective political acts.' 2 Both assertions are correct.
Both assertions are equally applicable to shooting merchants' fami-
lies or torching their stores in order to influence their decisions."3
Indeed, the ability to influence through shooting and torching is
probably more equally distributed than the ability to influence
through boycotting products, since a boycott by a rich consumer is
liable to have more impact than a boycott by a poor one.
The right-to-boycott that Harper asserts, moreover, is a highly
qualified right. First, he limits it to consumers and does not extend it
to "producers," whom he defines to include employees.' 4 Second, he
limits it to boycotts aimed at affecting decisionmaking, and excludes
those aimed at the status of the target.'5 There are other limitations
and embellishments, but these two are the most important and the
most problematic.
Harper wants to distinguish consumer from producer boycotts -
the latter to include employee as well as employer boycotts - be-
cause there is more equality of influence among consumers qua
9. Id. at 424-26.
10. See W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED TO JUDI-
CIAL REASONING 35-36 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919).
11. Harper, supra note 1, at 422.
12. Id. at 422-24.
13. If there were a right to influence merchants' decisions by shooting their fami-
lies or torching their stores, there would of course be no right of merchants not to have
their families shot or their stores torched that the state could assert to deny the former
rights: the former rights, if they exist, exclude rights that are logically inconsistent. See
W. HOHFELD, supra note 10.
14. Harper, supra note 1, at 426-28.
15. Id. at 429-30.
consumers than among producers qua producers. Harper argues in
support of his distinction that boycotts should be analogized to vot-
ing, where equality is prescribed, rather than to expenditures for
candidates, where equality may not be governmentally imposed.18
But the argument is question-begging, simplistic, and self-defeat-
ing. It is question-begging because it is unclear why voting rather
than campaign expenditure is the appropriate analogy to boycotting.
The argument is simplistic because some (e.g., rich) consumers qua
consumers have enormous leverage in a boycott whereas some pro-
ducers qua producers do not. And the argument is self-defeating be-
cause it would suggest that government could appropriately limit
even consumer boycotts to the level of influence exercisable by the
least influential consumer in order to effectuate the implied maxim
of "one consumer, one unit of boycott influence."
Moreover, Harper stipulates that consumer boycotts are legitimate
only when they are undertaken to influence merchants to act in legal
ways. 17 In many cases, this would allow the state to proscribe a boy-
cott by taking the preliminary step of prohibiting the merchant from
doing what the boycott seeks. For example, since many consumer
boycotts are aimed at inducing producer boycotts, and since Harper
would allow the state to deem the latter illegal, many consumer boy-
cotts might soon end up being unprotected. Thus, a consumer boy-
cott of supermarket chains that carry non-union lettuce might be
proscribed once a law is enacted forbidding the chains from discrimi-
nating against non-union produce. To take another example, Harper
would grant constitutional protection to boycotts designed to compel
"affirmative action" by businesses. "Voluntary race-conscious affirm-
ative action" is now legal, to be sure.18 It is at least conceivable,
however, that Congress might make it illegal if the Constitution
were otherwise read to prohibit any regulation of boycotts designed
to compel "race-consciousness" or "reverse discrimination." 9
16. Id. at 427-28. In the area of boycotts connected with labor disputes, Harper's
consumer-producer distinction leads to the following interesting result: a labor union may
organize a secondary consumer boycott but not a secondary labor boycott, even if in both
instances the boycotters are the employees of the secondary employer, and the aim of the
boycott is to affect a labor dispute elsewhere. See id. at 438-53.
17. Id. at 430-32.
18. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200 (1979).
19. The more general question is whether Harper is correct in placing consumer
boycotts aimed at compelling illegal action outside the ambit of the right to boycott.
Even if a boycott meets the "imminency" and "likelihood" (of lawless action) parts of
the Brandenburg v. Ohio test, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), there is
still a difference between "advocating" through words and "advocating" through with-
drawal of economic patronage. Suppose there are two firms, A and B, with whom you
can deal. The owner of firm A declares his intention not to pay taxes next year because
of his opposition to military aid to El Salvador. The owner of firm B declares his inten-
tion to comply with the tax laws, despite a similar opposition to military aid, in order to
stay out of prison. You declare that you will patronize firm A because you admire the
558
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As for the consumer-producer distinction, we suspect Harper in-
troduces it to avoid the slippery slope that leads to results that he
would find unwelcome. If we can refuse to buy Coors because of the
politics of the manufacturer, can the manufacturer refuse to buy
malt from farmers whose politics or religion he dislikes, or refuse to
hire workers whose politics or religion he dislikes? A non-absolute
right to boycott would make such a producer boycott a hard case,
and Harper would apparently rather forbid producer boycotts whole-
sale instead of requiring the courts to deal with them retail as hard
cases. Yet Harper has no convincing argument why producers or
workers should not be entitled to withhold their goods or services just
as consumers may withhold their patronage, so the limitation ap-
pears to be totally ad hoc. If we can refuse to buy Coors because of
the politics of the manufacturer, why can we not also refuse to work
for him for the same reason?
The same ad hoc quality attends Harper's limitation of the right
to boycott to those boycotts designed to affect decisionmaking, as
opposed to those boycotts aimed at the status of the target. One has
a right to boycott O'Brien's grocery store because O'Brien contrib-
utes to the Irish Republican Army, but one has no right to boycott
the store merely because O'Brien is Irish, Catholic, contributed to
the IRA in the past, or believes in an independent Ireland. 0 Accord-
ing to Harper, the limitation follows from the basis of the right to
boycott, namely, a right to influence social decisionmaking.
The problems with this limitation should be obvious. If O'Brien
contributes to the IRA because of his Catholicism or political be-
liefs, then the line between attacking beliefs and attacking social de-
cisions is not only "difficult"; 21 it may be illusory. O'Brien has a
right to contribute to the IRA so long as there is no law against it.
Indeed, the targets of consumer boycotts generally have the right to
engage in the activities to which the boycotters object. If the targets'
rights do not defeat the right to boycott, why should the beliefs or
statutes - which after all give rise to the targets' exercises of their
rights - be insulated from the right to boycott? If O'Brien's right to
contribute to the IRA is conditioned by others' rights to retaliate
through boycotts if he does so, why isn't his right to be Catholic or
Irish Republican not also conditioned? It is true that if the
courage of its owner's stand on civil disobedience. Is it clear you have no right to base
your patronage on that ground?
20. Harper, supra note 1, at 430.
21. Id.
legitimate purpose of a boycott is to influence decisionmaking, then a
boycott based on the immutable characteristics of the target would
be illegitimate. But one's religion and sometimes one's national affili-
ation are mutable in the sense that they are subject to choice. And
once "chosen," they compel other "choices." It hardly makes sense
to deem a boycott aimed at Orthodox Jews illegitimate while at the
same time deeming a boycott aimed at the wearing of yarmulkes
legitimate.
The anomalies produced by this limitation of the right to boycott
go beyond those born of the close connection between status and
choice. Harper would allow consumers to boycott merchants or man-
ufacturers in order to pressure them into adopting hiring policies
which are themselves based on status - for example, minority quo-
tas - so long as those policies are legal. Put differently, this means
that consumers cannot boycott based on status, but they can pressure
producers to do so. (A decision to hire based on race or other similar
characteristics is, after all, a sort of "boycott" based on the status of
those who are not hired as a result).
Moreover, by putting consumer boycotts based on the "target's"
status outside the constitutional pale, Harper implies that consumers
have no right to make economic decisions based on "status" consid-
erations (or immutable characteristics). Yet consumers and produc-
ers make a multitude of decisions every day regarding which prod-
ucts or services to purchase, or which persons to employ, all based on
status. I choose to see a movie because I like Bo Derek's looks. I buy
Oscar Mayer wieners because the company is (or appears to be)
Jewish-owned. I hire Brooke Shields, a fashion model, because I
think her name and her looks will sell magazines or dresses. I choose
a surgeon because she's smart or dexterous, or because she's a wo-
man or a black and I wish to boost the image of those groups, and so
on. Without trying to plumb how many of the qualities we prize are
inborn or immutable and how many are subject to choice, it is clear
that status - in the sense of conditions beyond the ability of choice
to affect - plays a large role in our individual economic decisions as
both consumers and producers. Harper implies that we have no right
to make, not just some of those decisions, but any of those decisions.
That is, to put it bluntly, absurd.
Harper cites NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware" as a seminal Su-
preme Court case in support of the right to boycott. Yet the case
illustrates an ironic twist to Harper's disqualification of boycotts
based on status. In Claiborne Hardware, a consumer boycott was
aimed at coercing influential merchants to affect local governmental
policy. Harper argues that the case is a paradigm of a legitimate
22. 102 S.Ct. 3409 (1982).
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boycott, since the boycott was by consumers and directed at target
decisionmaking. Yet suppose the government of Claiborne County,
Mississippi, had refused to capitulate to the boycotters' demands, de-
spite pressure from the targeted merchants. And suppose the boycot-
ters refused to stop the boycott until their demands were met. The
targeted merchants could rightly claim that the boycott, while puta-
tively aimed at their decisionmaking, was actually tantamount to a
status boycott because ending the boycott was beyond their (the tar-
get's) control. Perhaps very few boycotts - including the boycott in
Claiborne Hardware itself - are boycotts that fall within Harper's
constitutional right to boycott. If so, perhaps it is Harper's rendition
of the right to boycott that is in error.
Finally, it must be borne in mind that Harper's project is to estab-
lish an individual's right to refuse to deal. Even if, contrary to our
arguments, he were successful in establishing such a right and its
limitations, he would need to go further to establish the right of
groups to engage in concerted refusal to deal. The latter are, after
all, what we normally mean by boycotts and what was at issue in
Claiborne Hardware. Some libertarians would contend that individu-
als have a right to join together and take any concerted action that
consists of acts that as individuals they have a right to take, but
American jurisprudence here as elsewhere has refused to accept lib-
ertarian premises. For example, the antitrust and labor laws distin-
guish between individual refusals to deal (permitted) and concerted
refusals to deal (prohibited). a3 Harper does not base his individual
right to boycott on a straightforward libertarian objection to forced
transactions, and we assume he rejects such libertarianism. If so,
then converting his individual right to boycott into a right to take
concerted action would require an argument that Harper nowhere
even hints at.24
Harper not only claims that his principle of "political participa-
tion" "secures" the right to boycott against countervailing public
23. In the case of the labor laws, at least, the individual's right to refuse to deal
has strong constitutional overtones. See Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 (1926); Bird,
Sherman Act Limitations on Noncommercial Concerted Refusals to Deal, 1970 DUKE
L.J. 247. See also Alexander, Speech in the Local Marketplace: Implications of Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. for Local Regula-
tory Power, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 357, 376-77 (1977).
24. Even group refusals to deal premised on first amendment concerns, such as
exclusion of women from an organization devoted to promoting, among other things, the
political positions held by young men, are not necessarily constitutionally protected. See
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S.Ct. 3244 (1984); infra note 34.
interests;2 5 he also suggests that the countervailing public interests
might "vanish" in the face of his principle.26 We feel that there is a
qualified right to boycott, but we conclude that Harper has neither
"secured" any such right nor adequately defined its scope. It is an
intriguing, difficult subject. Unfortunately, it remains just as intrigu-
ing and difficult after Harper's article as it was beforehand.
A CONDITIONAL RIGHT TO BOYcOTT?
How might we establish a constitutional right to boycott that can-
not be outweighed by countervailing governmental interests? We
might attempt to do so by analogy to, or by implication from, rights
whose existence is relatively secure. For instance, it is fairly safe to
say that we have a first amendment right to spend our money on
speech activities, such as publishing a newspaper or taking out an ad
on TV or buying space on a billboard - at least to this extent: the
government may not ban such expenditures because it fears the
messages thereby expressed will prove too influential.27 If the expen-
diture of money on speech is protected, then spending it on speech
rather than beer is protected. One might then argue that refusing to
buy a product, when such refusal communicates a message, is not
relevantly different from spending money on purchasing messages
rather than on purchasing other products. Indeed, whether a con-
sumer prefers Brand X over Brand Y because of price, taste, work-
manship, or the politics of Y's producer, the consumer's expression
of that preference by buying X and not Y is, in a free market econ-
omy, supposed to communicate a message to Y's producer, a mes-
sage that may or may not influence Y's producer to change Y's
price, style, or workmanship, or the producer's politics. Denying the
right to boycott is really like forcing one to spend money on a prod-
uct rather than on a message for fear that the message may prove
too influential, which is like denying the right to spend money on
messages, a right which, however, was stipulated from the outset.
The trouble with this argument is that it goes considerably further
than have any decisions by the Supreme Court on the right to spend
money on speech. In none of the Supreme Court cases did the gov-
ernment claim an interest in protecting people from economic harm
stemming from the exercise by other people of their first amendment
rights. In a boycott, the resources that are spent on the "message"
would otherwise have gone to the target the message is intended to
influence. Not so in the Supreme Court cases from which the right
25. Harper, supra note 1, at 424.
26. Id. at 454.
27. See Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981); First
Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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to boycott might be derived. Indeed, Buckley v. Valeo,28 the leading
case for the right to spend money on expression, can also be cited for
the proposition that expenditures on expression can be legitimately
curtailed by the government if they carry the risk of unduly influenc-
ing, not the targets of the message intellectually, but the recipients
of the expenditures economically. 9 Similarly, Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education,3 0 which recognized the freedom-of-expression
interest in not paying union dues, nonetheless upheld governmental
compulsion of contributions to unions to support the unions' collec-
tive bargaining activities.3 1 Finally, if one is sceptical - as we are32
- of Harper's normative distinction between consumer and pro-
ducer boycotts, then a number of Supreme Court cases dealing with
secondary labor boycotts 33 stand in the way of establishing an abso-
lute right to express positions and to influence decisions through the
withdrawal of economic support.
There are other conceivable ways to derive a right to boycott, in
addition to those Harper mentions and the derivation we outline in
the immediately preceding paragraphs. For example, one might de-
rive it from a more general right to privacy, a right protecting choice
with respect to intimate matters such as what one consumes or with
whom one associates on a close basis.3 4 This right might protect
some consumer boycotts but also some refusals by producers to hire
particular employees and refusals by employees to work for particu-
lar employers. Thus, neither of the two limitations that Harper
28. 424 u.s. 1 (1976).
29. Id. at 23-38.
30. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
31. Id. at 223-32.
32. See supra text accompanying notes 16-19.
33. See International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, 456 U.S. 212, 226
(1982).
34. But cf. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S.Ct. 3244 (1984) (membership
in the Jaycees is not an "intimate personal relationship"). The Court found that the
Jaycees are an association that exists in part to exercise free speech in promoting the
interests of young men, but the Court held that the corresponding freedom-of-association
interest in excluding women is outweighed by a "compelling governmental interest" in
eradicating sex discrimination. See also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976)
("freedom of association" does not confer on private schools any right to practice racial
discrimination in excluding students).
Civil rights laws forbidding discrimination often do attempt to accommodate counter-
vailing interests in "privacy" and freedom of association. See, e.g., the exemption in the
public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for guesthouses in
which the proprietor lives and which offer five or fewer rooms for rent. Pub.L. 88-352, 78
Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1)(1982). See also the exemption from Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of employers with fewer than fifteen employees. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(b)(1982).
proposes on the right to boycott - namely ruling out producer boy-
cotts and those based on the status of the victim of the boycott-
would apply to the right to boycott derived from a right of privacy.
Still another way one might derive a right to boycott is from a
general libertarian position against forced transactions. The right to
boycott so derived would again contain neither of Harper's proposed
limitations. It would protect a private employer's right to discrimi-
nate on the basis of race in employment and in choosing clientele,
just as it would justify a consumer's right to boycott products. Need-
less to say, the courts have rejected constitutionalizing such pure lib-
ertarian principles.
For our part, we would draw on a number of values, including
those that Harper rightly rejects as bases for an absolute right to
boycott - values such as freedom of expression, freedom of associa-
tion, autonomy, and privacy - to conclude that political boycotts
deserve some, but not absolute, protection from government proscrip-
tion. This approach has the virtue of articulating the values that
might justify political boycotts, against which the government would
have to articulate weightier countervailing values in order to prohibit
a particular boycott or class of boycotts. In short, this approach rec-
ognizes that there is no "secure" right to boycott,35 and that the
courts must inevitably weigh competing values and interests when
disputes over boycotts arise.
We have summarized - rather telescopically - some possible ar-
guments for a right to boycott. The arguments we favor do not yield
an unqualified constitutional right to boycott, nor do they render the
hard cases easy. Accordingly, these are not Harper's arguments. Pro-
fessor Harper, in search of a clincher, finds himself with no argu-
ment at all.
35. Harper, supra note 1, at 424.
